Hypothesis

Expressions researched:
"hypotheses" |"hypothesis" |"hypothesize" |"hypothesized" |"hypothesy" |"hypothetical" |"hypothetically"

SB Canto 2

SB 2.2.35, Translation:

The Personality of Godhead Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa is in every living being along with the individual soul. And this fact is perceived and hypothesized in our acts of seeing and taking help from the intelligence.

SB Cantos 10.14 to 12 (Translations Only)

SB 11.21.42, Translation:

In the entire world no one but Me actually understands the confidential purpose of Vedic knowledge. Thus people do not know what the Vedas are actually prescribing in the ritualistic injunctions of karma-kāṇḍa, or what object is actually being indicated in the formulas of worship found in the upāsanā-kāṇḍa, or that which is elaborately discussed through various hypotheses in the jñāna-kāṇḍa section of the Vedas.

SB 11.21.43, Translation:

I am the ritualistic sacrifice enjoined by the Vedas, and I am the worshipable Deity. It is I who am presented as various philosophical hypotheses, and it is I alone who am then refuted by philosophical analysis. The transcendental sound vibration thus establishes Me as the essential meaning of all Vedic knowledge. The Vedas, elaborately analyzing all material duality as nothing but My illusory potency, ultimately completely negate this duality and achieve their own satisfaction.

SB 11.23.53, Translation:

And if we examine the hypothesis that the planets are the immediate cause of suffering and happiness, then also where is the relationship with the soul, who is eternal? After all, the effect of the planets applies only to things that have taken birth. Expert astrologers have moreover explained how the planets are only causing pain to each other. Therefore, since the living entity is distinct from these planets and from the material body, against whom should he vent his anger?

CC Adi-lila

CC Adi 6.14-15, Purport:

In the Sāṅkhya philosophy the puruṣa is described to be always indifferent to the activities of prakṛti.

"The Sāṅkhya philosopher accepts three kinds of evidences, namely direct perception, hypothesis and traditional authority. When such evidence is complete, everything is perfect. The process of comparison is within such perfection. Beyond such evidence there is no proof. There is not much controversy regarding direct perceptional evidence or authorized traditional evidence. The Sāṅkhya system of philosophy identifies three kinds of procedures—namely, pariṇāmāt (transformation), samanvayāt (adjustment) and śaktitaḥ (performance of energies)—as the causes of the cosmic manifestation."

CC Adi 16.83, Translation:

“The real glory of mother Ganges is that she has grown from the lotus feet of Lord Viṣṇu. Such a hypothesis is another ornament, called anumāna.

CC Madhya-lila

CC Madhya 6.81, Translation and Purport:

The disciples of the Bhaṭṭācārya said, "We derive knowledge of the Absolute Truth by logical hypothesis."

Gopīnātha Ācārya replied, "One cannot attain real knowledge of the Supreme Personality of Godhead by such logical hypothesis and argument."

The Māyāvādī philosophers in particular make certain hypotheses about the Absolute Truth. They reason that in the material world we experience that everything is created. If we trace the history of anything, we find a creator. Therefore there must be a creator of this huge cosmic manifestation. By such reasoning they come to the conclusion that a higher power has created this cosmic manifestation. The Māyāvādīs do not accept this great power to be a person.

CC Madhya 6.81, Purport:

Māyāvādī philosophers study the Vedic literature, but they do not understand that in the last stage of realization the Absolute Truth is the Supreme Personality of Godhead, Kṛṣṇa. They do accept the fact that there is a creator of this cosmic manifestation, but that is anumāna (hypothesis). The Māyāvādī philosophers' logic is something like seeing smoke on a hill and concluding that there is a fire. When there is a forest fire on a high hill, smoke is first of all visible. Since it is known that smoke is created when there is fire, from seeing the smoke on the hill one can conclude that a fire is burning there. Similarly, from seeing this cosmic manifestation the Māyāvādī philosophers conclude that there must be a creator.

CC Madhya 6.82, Translation:

Gopīnātha Ācārya continued, "One can understand the Supreme Personality of Godhead only by His mercy, not by guesswork or hypothesis."

CC Madhya 6.135, Purport:

In his book Sarva-saṁvādinī, Śrīla Jīva Gosvāmī has noted that although there are ten kinds of evidence—direct perception, the Vedic version, historical reference, hypothesis and so on—and although they are all generally accepted as evidence, the person presenting a hypothesis, reading the Vedic version, perceiving or interpreting by his experience is certain to be imperfect in four ways. That is, he is subject to committing mistakes, to becoming illusioned, to cheating and to having imperfect senses. Although the evidence may be correct, the person himself is in danger of being misled due to his material defects. Apart from the direct presentation, there is a chance that an interpretation may not be perfect. Therefore the conclusion is that only a direct presentation can be considered evidence. An interpretation cannot be accepted as evidence, but may be considered proof of evidence.

CC Madhya 6.137, Purport:

Out of four main types of evidence—direct perception, hypothesis, historical reference and the Vedas—Vedic evidence is accepted as the foremost. If we want to interpret the Vedic version, we must imagine an interpretation according to what we want to do. First of all, we set forth such an interpretation as a suggestion or hypothesis. As such, it is not actually true, and the self-evident proof is lost.

CC Madhya 7.66, Purport:

A Vaiṣṇava never agrees with the speculative system of the jñānīs. Both the jñānīs and karmīs depend on direct sense perception for their imperfect knowledge. The karmīs never agree to accept anything not directly perceived, and the jñānīs put forth only hypotheses. However, the Vaiṣṇavas, the unalloyed devotees of the Lord, do not follow the process of acquiring knowledge by direct sense perception or mental speculation. Because they are servants of the Supreme Lord, devotees receive knowledge directly from the Supreme Personality of Godhead as He speaks it in the Bhagavad-gītā, or sometimes as He imparts it from within as the caittya-guru.

CC Madhya 9.362, Purport:

In Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam (11.19.17), it is said:

śrutiḥ pratyakṣam aitihyam anumānaṁ catuṣṭayam

pramāṇeṣv anavasthānād vikalpāt sa virajyate

"Vedic literature, direct perception, history and hypothesis are the four kinds of evidential proofs. Everyone should stick to these principles for the realization of the Absolute Truth."

Teachings of Lord Caitanya

Teachings of Lord Caitanya, Chapter 24:

Lord Caitanya protested against misinterpretations of the Upaniṣads, and He rejected any explanation which did not give the direct meaning of the Upaniṣads. The direct interpretation is called abhidhā-vṛtti, whereas the indirect interpretation is called lakṣanā-vṛtti, The indirect interpretation serves no purpose. There are four kinds of understanding, called: (1) direct understanding (pratyakṣa), (2) hypothetical understanding (anumāna), (3) historical understanding (aitihya) and (4) understanding through sound (śabda). Of these four, understanding from the Vedic scriptures (which are the sound representations of the Absolute Truth) is the best method. The traditional Vedic students accept understanding through sound to be the best.

Sri Isopanisad

Sri Isopanisad Introduction:

There are three kinds of evidence: pratyakṣa, anumāna and śabda. Pratyakṣa means "direct evidence." Direct evidence is not very good because our senses are not perfect. We are seeing the sun daily, and it appears to us just like a small disc, but it is actually far, far larger than many planets. Of what value is this seeing? Therefore we have to read books; then we can understand about the sun. So direct experience is not perfect. Then there is anumāna, inductive knowledge: "It may be like this"—hypothesis. For instance, Darwin's theory says it may be like this, it may be like that. But that is not science. That is a suggestion, and it is also not perfect. But if you receive the knowledge from the authoritative sources, that is perfect. If you receive a program guide from the radio station authorities, you accept it. You don't deny it; you don't have to make an experiment, because it is received from the authoritative sources.

Bhagavad-gita As It Is Lectures

Lecture on BG 2.8-12 -- Los Angeles, November 27, 1968:

There are three kinds of evidences accepted by the learned scholars in Vedic culture. One evidence is pratyakṣa. Pratyakṣa means direct perception. Just like I am seeing you, you are seeing me. I am present, you are present. This is direct perception. And there is another evidence which is called anumāna. Suppose in that room, and I am coming just now, I do not know whether any person there is or not. But there is some sound, I can imagine, "Oh, there is somebody." This is called anumāna. In logic it is called hypothesis. That is also evidence. If by my bona fide suggestions I can give evidence, that is also accepted. So direct evidence, and, what is called, hypothesis or suggestion evidence. But the strong evidence is śabda-pramāṇa. Śabda, śabda-brahman. That means Vedas. If one can give evidence from the quotation of the Vedas, then it has to be accepted.

Lecture on BG 2.20-25 -- Seattle, October 14, 1968:

There are three kinds of evidences. Pratyakṣa, direct sense perception, and śabda-pramāṇa, evidence from the Vedic statement, and anumāna, aitihya, historical or hypothesis. So out of all evidences, the evidence which is called, derived from Vedic statement, that is accepted as most authoritative. Therefore Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad and Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, they are Vedas. There is statement that two birds are sitting on the same tree. The tree is compared, the body is compared with the tree. And two birds, namely the Supersoul, Kṛṣṇa, and the living entity, individual soul, they are sitting together. And one is eating the fruit of the tree and the other is simply witnessing. This is our position.

Lecture on BG 2.46-47 -- New York, March 28, 1966:

Just like in India... Of course, I heard this story from my professor when I was a student of logic in my I.A. class. And this example was given by my professor, Dr. Purnachandra Sena. I still remember that when first railway was started from Howrah to Burdwan, about sixty-four miles, during British period, say, about two hundred years before, now the cultivators on both sides of the line, they were seeing the railway engine going with wonder: "Oh!" So somebody... This story was cited in connection with chapter of hypothesis. In logic there is a chapter of hypothesis. So somebody suggested that "There must be horse within the engine. Otherwise it cannot go." Because they have got experience that without horse nothing can be pulled on. It is horseless, so the hypothesis was that "There must be horses within the engine. Otherwise it cannot go." So similarly, the machine, the machine, however wonderful it may be, so if not horse, at least if there is no driver it cannot move. It cannot move.